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Demand managementWater markets are increasingly proposed as a demand-management strategy to deal with water scarcity.
Water trading arrangements, on their own, are not about setting bio-physical limits to water-use.
Nevertheless, water trading that mitigates scarcity constraints can assist regulators of water resources
to keep water-use within limits at the lowest possible cost, and may reduce the cost of restoring water
system health. While theoretically attractive, many practitioners have, at best, only a limited understand-
ing of the practical usefulness of markets and how they might be most appropriately deployed. Using les-
sons learned from jurisdictions around the world where water markets have been implemented, this
study attempts to fill the existing water market development gap and provide an initial framework
(the water market readiness assessment (WMRA)) to describe the policy and administrative condi-
tions/reforms necessary to enable governments/jurisdictions to develop water trading arrangements that
are efficient, equitable and within sustainable limits. Our proposed framework consists of three key
steps: 1) an assessment of hydrological and institutional needs; 2) a market evaluation, including assess-
ment of development and implementation issues; and 3) the monitoring, continuous/review and assess-
ment of future needs; with a variety of questions needing assessment at each stage. We apply the
framework to three examples: regions in Australia, the United States and Spain. These applications indi-
cate that WMRA can provide key information for water planners to consider on the usefulness of water
trading processes to better manage water scarcity; but further practical applications and tests of the
framework are required to fully evaluate its effectiveness.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The supply of fresh water is finite and, in many locations, suffi-
ciently scarce such that it is not possible to satisfy all competing
uses. The challenge of reconciling supply and demand will inten-
sify as global water extractions are expected to increase 55% by
2050 (WWAP, 2014). This raises concerns about future trends in
global water security; defined as the ability to safeguard access
to water for livelihoods and development, to protect against water
pollution and water-related disasters, to preserve ecosystems, and
to help ensure peace and political stability (UN Water, 2013). At
the very least it requires approaches to water governance that
explicitly acknowledge the need to manage risks and to live within
bio-physical limits, even if the precise management approaches are
contested (Garrick and Hall, 2014).There are two diverse arrangements for dealing with water
scarcity risk and reallocation: demand-side management and sup-
ply augmentation. Demand-side management includes educa-
tional measures (e.g. providing information on how to decrease
water-use in homes/farms), regulatory and/or planning processes
(e.g. legislative change coupled with catchment water-sharing
plans or restrictions) and economic incentives (e.g. pricing to dis-
courage over-use, the use of subsidies that increase technical
water-use efficiency, and/or arrangements that allow the trading
of limited opportunities to use water). Supply augmentation (e.g.
further dam and weir construction) or substitution (e.g. desali-
nated water) has traditionally been used and promoted by man-
agers because it offers a technical and relatively rapid ‘fix’ to
address demand gaps. Ideally, both demand and supply responses
should be integrated, but this is frequently not the case, highlight-
ing the need for governance arrangements that better coordinate
water demand and supply (Sadoff et al., 2015).
Three main water reallocation approaches are usually discussed
in the literature: administrative, collective negotiations or
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Ringler, 2008). Market-based reallocation may be unsuitable for
developing economies due to less-clearly specified, distributed
and prioritised water rights; uncertain operational rules; inade-
quate or disconnected supply and distribution infrastructure and
poor water source, supply, usage and measurement data; and
unequal access to the rule of law. In such places, less complex
and costly non-market reallocation approaches may be more suit-
able (Marston and Cai, 2016); especially where a priority is placed
on equity and delivery of water to the poor and vulnerable rather
than efficiency considerations. However, in many developed
economies growing water scarcity, greater environmental concern
and limited supply-side options have driven an increased emphasis
of demand-side reallocation policies, especially water pricing,
charges and markets. Often, the establishment of the conditions
that enable efficient trading and the eventual full emergence of
markets is more accidental than planned (Griffin, 2006). Propo-
nents of water markets argue they offer more efficient and effec-
tive approaches to reallocate water, and can also protect social
and environmental values (e.g. Chong and Sunding, 2006; Crase
and O’Keefe, 2009). By contrast, others suggest markets commodify
water to benefit the wealthy and powerful at the expense of the
most vulnerable, their communities or the environment (Barlow
and Clarke, 2005). Market power, especially in economies where
there are gross income inequalities, can drive negative perceptions
of markets as a well-accepted means of reallocating water (Easter
and Huang, 2014) and also increase the transaction costs to achieve
market arrangements. Debate about water markets has also occa-
sionally focused on the privatisation of urban water supplies
(Goldman, 2007; Segerfeldt, 2005). Regardless of the viewpoint,
achieving water security remains a major global challenge, and
for this reason water markets still remain a possible policy
response.
To address the water scarcity challenge, useful general frame-
works exist for comparing water institutions (e.g. Dinar and
Saleth, 2005) and also for proposing improvements to water mar-
ket implementation and performance. These relate to issues of
effective legal property rights (Tan, 2005), exchange frameworks
for efficient transfers (Griffin, 2006), initial implementation recom-
mendations (Maestu and Gómez Ramos, 2013) and agendas for
comparison and performance evaluations across different water
market contexts (Grafton et al., 2011). Nevertheless, despite signif-
icant attention devoted to the study of water rights/markets there
is, until now, very little practical guidance to evaluate the appro-
priateness of water markets in emergent or semi-developed situa-
tions (Young, 2014b). Given the multi-decade experience of water
markets in a number of countries, it is timely to distil insights
about markets as a response to water scarcity. For the first time
in the literature, we provide a framework that identifies the condi-
tions necessary to facilitate reallocation via water trading; where
that arrangement is perceived as an appropriate strategy. Our
intent is for the framework to be used by water managers and
planners to identify possible barriers to the implementation of
water markets. In so doing, we stress that we do not propose water
markets as a universal solution for the multidimensional problems
of water security.2. Conceptual background and water market development
factors
2.1. Water trading
Water trading can be defined as the voluntary buying and sell-
ing of water in some quantifiable form; either in the present or
future. In essence, there are three types of water trading: i)short-term or temporary transfers of water that is already allo-
cated and available for immediate use; ii) medium-term leasing
of water allocations in a manner that enables a water user to plan
secure access to water for a period of time; and iii) permanent
transfers of water entitlements – the on-going property right to
either a proportion or fixed quantity of the available water at a
given source. Water trading arrangements can range from informal
arrangements between neighbours (Maestu, 2013; Shah and
Ballabh, 1997); to formal recognition and management by govern-
ments and/or communities. Formal government and/or commu-
nity sanctioned water trading arrangements involve a variety of
rules and processes designed to protect the interests of all users,
including third parties who might otherwise be adversely effected
(NWC, 2011a,b). The formal trade of water thus has a number of
possible benefits; including that it can help ensure that water-
use costs (and its opportunity costs), are explicitly accounted for
by water users.
A key challenge for those interested in the role of water trading
in helping to manage water-use is the fact that water is an ‘un-
cooperative’ commodity (Bakker, 2005, 2007). Its value is derived
not only from its quantity, but also its quality, reliability, timing,
and location and use. In many cases, trade involves re-allocation:
sometimes only to a neighbour as mentioned above, but increas-
ingly to other sectors and even other regions (Grafton et al.,
2011). Trade can, and often does, change who, where and how
water is used, which can affect subsequent extraction by down-
stream parties or future use of aquifers. Thus, changes in the loca-
tion, timing and technical efficiency of water-use matter (Bauer,
2004; Easter et al., 1999; Howe et al., 1986; Young and McColl,
2009), as does the costs of trading and enforcing water rights
(Garrick et al., 2013; McCann and Easter, 2004) and the effects
on non-consumptive uses such as transport, hydro-power genera-
tion and the environment.
Considerable progress has been made in the development of
water trading and marketing arrangements. Countries such as Aus-
tralia, the United States, Chile, Mexico, South Africa and China are
increasingly using water trading and marketing arrangements to
improve water-use. Despite this progress, the expanded use of for-
mal water trading and marketing arrangements remains highly
contentious. The complexity of water trade in wider social-
ecological systems also means that trading is not able to compre-
hensively resolve all socio-economic issues around water-use
(Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Indeed, Grafton et al. (2016) provide a crit-
ical review of the arguments for and against water trading, but
conclude that while both social and environmental goals are com-
patible with water markets, careful design and effective oversight
are required for any broader jurisdictional application.
2.2. Necessary conditions
The capacity of water access and allocation arrangements to
allow water trading critically depends on local circumstances, the
range of future scenarios (and the extent to which they can be
known) and the available regulatory architecture (Maestu and
Gómez Ramos, 2013). For example, it is common not to control
or limit the extraction of water for livestock watering, but access
arrangements for cropping can vary enormously by location. Thus,
differences in approaches to water trading across locations
requires an assessment of what works, and under what conditions
(Easter and Huang, 2014).
There are many institutional factors that should be considered
when governments contemplate the establishment of water enti-
tlement and allocation regimes. Institutional arrangements neces-
sary to enable efficient and equitable water trading should be in
place well-before scarcity is realized, to prevent over-allocation.
Proactive management of water resources can be achieved by early
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and governance capacity. Consequently, many of the modifications
and enabling conditions required to establish and sustain water
markets are also issues associated with sound water resource gov-
ernance generally.
Matthews (2004) highlights ten questions relevant for any dis-
cussion about the establishment or reformation of any water rights
system, which have significance for water managers interested in
subsequent market adoption. These include: how any rights to
water are currently specified, distributed and prioritised; whether
existing rights are tradeable in nature, or if transformation would
be required; how clear are current operational water-use rules,
and can they assist/hinder transfers; how certain are we of our
data on current source, supply, usage and measurement; how
should we enforce change or compensate losers in the modifica-
tions proposed, and who will achieve this; and are all aspects of
the system (e.g. groundwater interaction, return flows, losses
etc.) accounted for in the design of water markets. Issues that
might help to stimulate water markets are also discussed such as
adopting uniform rights across all uses (but with heterogeneous
use-reliability or preferences), increased water pricing, removing
spatial limitations to use, and adopting a national registry system
(ibid.). This highlights the need to design water rights and, if neces-
sary, respecify them as part of an integrated reform agenda. When
changes are required such that water trading efficiently and equi-
tably retains water use within sustainable limits, then there may
also be a need for institutional capacity-building and adaptive gov-
ernance arrangements to ensure effective and sustainable imple-
mentation (Marino and Kemper, 1998).
The literature and practical experiences show that water mar-
kets are far from a simple panacea for water reallocation problems.
Rather, they are often one of the more complex economic instru-
ments to design, develop, implement and sustain over time. Based
on the Australian experience of water markets, Young (2014a)
offers six valuable institutional design principles: i) separate water
access arrangements into their various component parts; ii) assign
any policy instruments for specific purposes only, and do not use
multi-instruments; iii) design instruments with hydrological
integrity; iv) keep transaction costs as low as possible; v) assign
risk to one interest group; and vi) ensure robustness of a system
through proper accounting for water-uses. Although there remain
relatively few examples of water markets around the world, and
expected benefits from marketing are often unmet due to complex
impediments, analyses of global water markets suggest that other
essential prerequisites exist. These include: initial allocation trans-
parency; legal clarity and certainty; administrative capacity to
cope with changing use arrangements; and vertically and horizon-
tally nested arrangements intended to keep institution costs as low
as possible (Grafton et al., 2011). Further, Perry (2013) proposes an
ABCD + F (accounting, bargaining, codification, delegation and
feedback) list of requirements for effective water resource manage-
ment. Unfortunately, inadequate institutional capabilities of many
countries mean that the journey to water trading arrangements
that adequately respond to water security will be long and arduous
(Grafton et al., 2016), and firmly out of the reach of some develop-
ing nations until such issues are resolved.
The OECD (2015) developed a 14-point ‘health’ check-list for
water resource allocation institutional design. Trading arrange-
ments are last in this check-list, suggesting that major transforma-
tional reform may be initially necessary together with careful
attention to sequencing, to avoid lock-in arrangements that make
further transition to water trading arrangements politically diffi-
cult. Indeed, we argue that on-going debate about the merits, or
otherwise, of water trading continues because the institutional
arrangements used to manage water resources have not been
adequately designed to manage water scarcity. As a result, naïvedecisions to allow ‘unfettered’ water trade prior to the reconfigura-
tion of the administrative arrangements to adequately manage
water supply and demand can be damaging to, rather than sup-
portive of, water security (Maestu, 2013; Young, 2014b). Moreover,
immature governance arrangements have led to calls for the adop-
tion of non-market approaches to reallocation in regions where
water rights are poorly defined and/or institutional capacity is lim-
ited (Marston and Cai, 2016).
Alternatives to water markets exist, but may result in less sus-
tainable and effective outcomes in the longer-term. Where envi-
ronmental watering objectives increasingly feature in policy-
making, market-based reallocation approaches offer attractive
and practical means for future adaptation in the face of uncertainty
insomuch as they offer management discretion over water-use.
Like Garrick et al. (2009), we emphasise that additional enablers
such as necessary administrative procedures, organisational devel-
opment/capacity to affect transfers, and adaptive mechanisms to
overcome legal, economic, cultural and environmental barriers
are required.
We contend that a desire or need for marketing reallocation
arrangements will grow naturally in many contexts from the adop-
tion of administrative or collective reallocation arrangements;
prompting an increasing practical requirement for a water market
assessment framework. The numerous and complex barriers to
water reallocation raised by Marston and Cai (2016) motivate the
need for a water market framework that can be used by water
managers and planners around the world. Such a common non-
prescriptive framework to evaluate the appropriateness of water
allocation arrangements to facilitate low-cost trading, and how
they might be developed in differing contexts, has yet to be pro-
duced (Grafton et al., 2016). Our purpose here, therefore, is to pro-
vide a very first framework attempt to fill this important
knowledge and practise gap.3. Developing water markets further
3.1. Exploring the case of the most advanced water market in the
world – the MDB
While we acknowledge the limits on transferability arising from
contextual circumstances that allowed markets to flourish in Aus-
tralia, lessons drawn from a jurisdiction with long-running and
successful water rights/market arrangements may offer a basis
for such a framework. In particular, the southern Murray-Darling
Basin (MDB) trading arrangements are often held up as a model
for the rest of world to follow (Perry, 2013).
The MDB comprises four Australian states and one territory:
(Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), South Australia
(SA), Victoria (VIC) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)). This
basin is federally managed under joint-agreement. An independent
Authority is responsible for Basin-wide planning, with states
responsible for the issuing of entitlements and management of
water use within agreed limits. Federal responsibilities, primarily
through the Authority, include: setting, monitoring and enforcing
water market rules; monitoring, evaluation and enforcement of
the Basin Plan enacted in 2012; determining water allocations
for the environment; and prioritising annual environmental water-
ing (Hart, 2016).
Within-state water allocation trades (i.e. spot or temporary
trade) have been occurring since 1983 in NSW and SA, and since
1987 in Victoria. Water entitlement (i.e. permanent) trades have
been allowed since 1983 (SA), 1989 (NSW/QLD) and 1991 (VIC);
with interstate trades possible since 1995 (Wheeler et al.,
2014a). Water allocation trade has grown substantially in the
MDB since agreements to unbundle water licences from land
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water extractions and use. Agricultural producers, by far the big-
gest MDB water users (ABS, 2013), have become more accepting
of water markets over time and found it beneficial to their business
(Grafton et al., 2016). Reviews of the economic impact of water
trading in the MDB have found it increased regional domestic pro-
duct by AUD$4.3 billion during the last major drought (2006–
2011) (NWC, 2012). Further, between 2000–01 and 2007–08,
despite a 70% decline in MDB irrigated surface-water, water trade,
changes in farm crop prices and other adaptation meant that the
adjusted gross value of irrigated production only fell 20% (Kirby
et al., 2014). Water trading is now widely used as a risk-
management strategy (Nauges et al., 2016; Zuo et al., 2014), has
been of considerable social and economic value to individual water
users and to rural communities, and has resulted in positive envi-
ronmental outcomes (NWC, 2012).
Expected negative trade impacts, such as reductions in regional
spending, employment and public services as a consequence of
permanently traded water out of districts via markets (Alston
and Whittenbury, 2011) and stranded infrastructure assets, have
largely been avoided in the MDB. Notwithstanding the successes
of water trading in the MDB there are deficiencies or gaps that cur-
rently exist in the MDB which have arisen from current and histor-
ical policy that include: unnecessary trade barriers, the need for
improved water market and weather information, limited types
of water trade products, inadequate understanding of return flow
impacts, and possible future lock-in of some enterprises, like
perennial production systems (Grafton et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
the southern MDB offers a valuable context from which to draw
insights that assist in the development of a water market readiness
assessment framework (Table 1).3.2. Developing fundamental water market enablers
The first step toward developing a water market readiness
assessment framework involved establishing a set of prerequisites
and fundamental water market enablers, as derived from our liter-
ature review and other countries’ water market experiences or
knowledge. Table 2 summarises the fundamental issues to beTable 1
Insights from the Australian experience in the development of water trading and marketi
1. The legacy of prior licensing decisions can result in markets causing over-allo
and ecosystems.
2. Transaction and administrative costs are lower when entitlements are define
3. Market efficiency is improved by using separate structures to define entitlem
4. Early attention to the development of accurate licence registers is critical an
systems.
5. Unless water market and allocation procedures allow unused water to be car
6. Early installation of meters and conversion from area based licences to a volu
cost allocation trading systems.
7. Difficulties will be encountered within communities to plan for (and believe
shift to a drier regime must be developed.
8. The allocation regime for the provision of water necessary to maintain minim
secure than that used to allocate water for environmental and other purpose
9. Unless all forms of water-use are accounted for, entitlement reliability will be
development, increases in irrigation efficiency, etc.
10. Unless connected ground and surface-water systems are managed as an inte
future allocation (and use) of surface-water.
11. Water-use and investment will be more efficient if all users are exposed to at l
One way of achieving this outcome is to transfer ownership of the supply sy
12. Manage environmental externalities using separate instruments so that the co
that encourages water users to avoid creating them.
13. Remove administrative impediments to inter-regional trade and inter-state t
14. Markets will be more efficient and the volume of trade greater if entitlements
companies and cooperatives.
15. Equity and fairness principles require careful attention to and discipline in th
16. Water markets are more effective when information about the prices being p
17. Develop broking industry and avoid government involvement in the provisioconsidered, and provides some key examples of the questions that
could be used by practitioners to evaluate the need for, and devel-
opment paths toward, water markets. The resultant set of prereq-
uisites have been transformed into a series of water market
enabling and constraining factors; with the full set of relevant
questions provided in Appendix A. The Appendix also provides fur-
ther detail of prioritisation and key importance of specific issues,
with five stars indicating high priority and importance for water
trade to be successful, and one star indicating low priority/
importance.4. A water market readiness assessment (WMRA) framework
4.1. Developing the framework
After further refinement and discussion of the insights drawn
from our literature review and knowledge, and considering issues
relevant to developing countries with low institutional capacity,
a conceptual Water Market Readiness Assessment (WMRA) frame-
work that involved three key steps was developed (Fig. 1).
The first step of the WMRA (Background Context) is a scoping
exercise that establishes the context of a proposed market such as
planning considerations, and established resource knowledge that
allows for a definitive cap or an initial allocation/extraction level.
The importance of institutional capacity is critical in the first step,
including careful consideration of: broad reviews of the status and
maturity of water rights, governance and institutional capacity, the
current level of infrastructure development and operational rules,
and the availability and quality of water data. Where these are
insufficiently progressed and do not meet minimum requirements
(for example, those stipulated in Matthews, 2004), non-market
reallocation arrangements may be more appropriate and further
use of the framework should cease until better institutional capac-
ity is developed. However, if deemed to be sufficient for market-
based arrangements, then further steps may be taken.
The second step (Market evaluation, development and imple-
mentation) goes beyond simply considering capacity, and assesses
the current institutional arrangements that support or impede
trading (discussed further in Section 4.3). The third stepng arrangements.
cation problems to emerge in a manner that erodes the health of rivers, aquifer
d using a unit share structure, and not as an entitlement to a volume of water.
ents, manage allocations and control the use of water.
d a necessary precondition to the development of low-cost entitlement trading
ried forward from year to year, trading may increase the severity of droughts.
metric management system is a necessary precursor to the development of low
in) an adverse climate shift, but water-sharing plans that account for a climatic
um flows, provide for conveyance and cover evaporative losses need to be more
s.
eroded by expansion of un-metered uses like plantation forestry and farm dam
grated resource, groundwater development and substitution will impact on the
east the full lower bound cost (preferably the upper bound cost) of water supply.
stem to these users.
sts of avoiding them are reflected in the costs of production and use in a manner
rade.
are allocated to individual users rather than to irrigator controlled water supply
e way that allocation decisions and policy changes are announced.
aid and offered is made available to all participants in a timely manner.
n of water brokering services. Source: Adapted from Young (2010)
Table 2
Identifying fundamental water market enablers.
Fundamental Issues Key example questions to guide discussion/thinking
Property Rights/Institutions:
Unbundled, individuals versus environment, risk assignment, adaptive etc. Does legislation exist which gives a clear understanding of rights to water for
individuals/corporations and other legal entities? If so, is the degree of attenuation
clear, and which legislation (or pieces of legislation) are pertinent? Does
institutional capacity exist in the country to allow robust, transparent and secure
water reform?
Governance:
Legislation, water sharing plans, information availability, water allocation
announcements, compliance etc.
Are enabling resources (such as information, planning resources and registers)
available, reliable, legitimate and trustworthy? Is the administrative culture and
behaviour of those involved in making decisions respected and trusted?
Hydrology:
Connected systems, salinity and water quality considerations, limit &
consequences of breach? environment? end of system, do we know what
we don’t know etc.
Is the hydrology of the system well understood, well documented, monitored and
reported on in a way that is supportive of trade and is sympathetic to:
 The resource constraint, and
 The extent to which the knowledge of the resource is complete?
Entitlement registers and accounting systems:
Ownership, trading rules, tracking use Does the supplier have the systems, resources and technology to monitor use, and
to ensure use is within constraints, licence/entitlement conditions? Are the
registers and accounting systems used to track and enforce compliance robust?
System Type:
Regulated/unregulated, surface water/groundwater, connectivity etc. What is the status of infrastructure and what are the costs of accessing water in the
system, and at various parts of the system?
Adjustment:
Heterogeneity? Gains from trade, societal pressures, early-mover advantage etc. Is there a sufficiently diverse (potential) market for water-use in the system so as to
facilitate trade (willing buyers and sellers with different use profiles in terms of
value add per $ of water) and what is the likely magnitude of these gains (ex-
transaction costs)?
Externalities Are effective arrangements in place to maintain water quality, ensure
environmental outcomes, facilitate navigation, hydro-power generation, etc.?
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tinual review and assessment of water trading in the pursuit of fur-
ther gains as experience emerges. The importance of considering
sequential steps for the successful development and implementa-
tion is noted by Young (2014b). Our approach is consistent with
Young’s sequential market steps, but what we propose is non-
prescriptive—and therefore not necessarily sequential or mutually
exclusive. That is, although the process may appear linear, in fact
progress can be made in parallel or by entering the framework at
any relevant stage where enabling conditions permit. Our three
steps thus provide a logical order for assessing the necessary pre-
conditions where they may not currently exist, and offer multiple
entry/exit points for water managers/planners. A more detailed
analysis of each step follows.4.2. Step One: Background context
The first step involves an evaluation of current institutional, leg-
islative, planning and regulatory capacity to facilitate and/or allow
water trade (Existing institutional, planning and property right
arrangements). We expect that for many countries, institutional
capacity is insufficiently progressed and does not meet minimum
requirements to be able to proceed with water market reforms.
Effective water trading arrangements fundamentally require a
clearly specified set of entitlement and allocation arrangements
that are monitored and enforced. Arguably one of the first admin-
istrative challenges is to establish a regime that ensures that water
users can understand their entitlements and how to transfer them.
This is challenging if the current situation involves significant over-
extraction/consumption. Ideally, the water governance arrange-
ments should: i) fully specify each share of the resource in perpe-
tuity while allowing for changes in the proportion allocated to each
share; ii) define the opportunity to use water in an unambiguousmanner that fully assigns responsibility for managing supply risk
to users; iii) be enforceable and ensure that the only way one user
can access more water is to convince someone else to use less
water; and iv) keep transaction costs as low as possible.
Water scarcity is a common motive for implementing water
markets (Easter et al., 1998). Thus, in addition to institutional
capacity issues, a clear calculation and definition of the total
resource pool available for consumptive use, and how that may
change over time (Hydrology Considerations and System Type),
needs to be conducted (Freebairn, 2005). This should be combined
with clear rules for the allocation of that defined resource pool.4.3. Step Two: Evaluation, development and implementation
Effective water market governance includes the separation of
regulatory, policy, commercial and operational functions associ-
ated with the water resource(s) in question. It also includes clear
and consistent trading rules, as well as compliance and enforce-
ment mechanisms (NWC, 2011a). There must also be a sufficient
volume of exchange to overcome potential inefficiencies. Hence,
the second step of the framework is to assess the Potential benefits
of trade. For example, there has to be consideration of the number
of individuals involved, the homogeneity of water-use, the poten-
tial benefit from trade and changes in water-use behaviour that
can be derived, the direct costs associated with the governmental
and institutional policy reforms necessary to enable trade, and
the transaction costs associated with implementation and ongoing
use. When the results suggest that there are significant net bene-
fits, then this information needs to be packaged into two narra-
tives: one that can be understood by the public and a second
much more comprehensive narrative for consideration by profes-
sional analysts and those likely to be involved in facilitating
implementation.
Step 1: 
Background 
context
Step 2: Market 
evaluation, 
development and 
implementation  
Step 3: Monitoring 
and continuous 
review/ assessment  
Hydrology 
considerations and 
system type  
Existing institutional, 
planning and property 
right arrangements  
Potential benefits from trade?
Basic assessment of costs and benefits: 
- externalities 
- governance/institution costs 
- transactions costs 
- number of users/sectoral activity  
Yes  No  
Market scale: 
Management regime 
commensurate with 
potential market/trading 
activities  
Market initiating change II -
water market institution changes 
(e.g. trade rules, registers)
Trade enabling mechanisms:
Monitoring externalities and new 
market developments. Change as 
required  
Maintain status quo: -
with enablers for trade 
and further monitoring if 
future demand or context 
changes  
Market initiating change I -
water market policy changes (e.g. 
legislation, plans)
Example 1: 
Diamond 
Valley, USA  
Example 3: 
Tasmanian 
Irrigation, 
Australia  
Example 2: 
Guadalquivir 
Basin, Spain  
Fig. 1. Conceptual assessment approach for considering the readiness of jurisdictions for water markets.
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costs (for example, where participants are charged very high costs
to transfer entitlements or allocations or face extremely long pro-
cessing times to do so). There may also be price-setting influences
as a result of limited competition among market participants; and
potential externalities where the buyers and sellers do not exclu-
sively enjoy and incur all of the benefits and costs (respectively)
associated with trade. If a critical trading volume and benefit can
be achieved, there may be scale economies associated with broader
market implementation. This involves a move to Market initiating
change I in Fig. 1, where broader legislation is put in place to allow
for water reform, which then leads on to Market initiating change II
where more detailed water reform leads to improvements like reg-
isters and clearer trade rules. If the assessments at Step 2 points to
modest gains from trade, then the best policy for water managers/-
planners may be toMaintain the status quo, but at the same time to
instigate enablers for trade (which would allow transfers between
a small number of individuals but not a fully functioning water
market per se) back at Step 1’s Existing institutional, planning and
property right arrangements. Continual monitoring is also needed
to assess future demand or context changes (which may move
the planner to the sub-step of Market initiating change I).4.4. Step Three: Monitoring and review
The development of water trading typically requires continuous
monitoring, review and assessment whatever the stage of market
development; but especially where it is to be sustained over thelong-term. This mainly involves further development of the Trade
enabling mechanisms in Step 3. This will include efforts to limit/
reduce transaction costs, adapt to new information as it arises,
and to scan for unanticipated externalities and opportunities for
refined market products (e.g. option contracts or water banks)
(Wheeler et al., 2013, 2014a,b). Such monitoring may, in turn,
reveal additional changes to information sources or collection
methods that then require legislative change, or new planning
requirements/infrastructure projects to improve trade capacity
(putting the planner back to review Step 1’s Existing institutional,
planning and property right arrangements).
Experimentation and adaptation is not uncommon in countries
where water markets have been previously implemented (Maestu,
2013), and building flexibility into trading rules and procedures
serves to enhance water security and management robustness;
especially where risk needs to be accommodated along with future
uncertainty (Garrick and Hall, 2014). It is also possible that flexibil-
ity in trading arrangements may provide opportunities for political
intervention in the market. Thus, an appropriate balance between
rule and process adaptation and surety is highly desirable. In the
next section we explore applications of the framework in three
examples to assess its practical usefulness in different circumstances.5. Applied examples
Three location-specific examples to apply the framework were
chosen based on several considerations. First, we focussed on juris-
dictions where water markets are discussed as a possible means for
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areas where water stress by 2040 as a ratio of withdrawals to sup-
ply is expected to be high (i.e. 40–80% (Maddocks et al., 2015)).
Third, we chose countries at different levels of water market devel-
opment, including: incomplete unbundling of land and water
rights; uncertainty about water right definitions; unfinished catch-
ment or water planning processes; limited time for development of
trading rules; reluctance to cap extraction levels; an absence of
water entitlement registers, water allocation accounts, inadequate
metering, trading platforms, trade processing systems, market
information; and/or a lack of administrative experience.
5.1. Applied Example One: Nevada’s Diamond Valley, USA
The first example is the Diamond Valley area near Eureka in
central Nevada (Fig. 2). This location has a tightly connected and
rapidly-depleting groundwater resource, with no connections to
other water resources. In addition, the community of water users
is small and all the actors know one another.
Applying Step 1’s Hydrology Considerations and System Type cri-
teria, the Diamond Valley area contains a rich groundwater aquifer
servicing irrigation, urban, mining and livestock uses. Current
groundwater extraction rights of 160,354ML have been issued,
with annual use estimated around 114,715ML, while the sustain-
able annual yield is estimated at just 43,170ML (hence indicating
that around 70% of rights need to be retired to ensure sustainable
water use). This over-use has resulted in aquifer declines of about
1–4 feet per year. Full aquifer depletion is expected in 30 years.
Approximately 95% of committed water rights in the Valley are
vested with primary or secondary irrigation farms. Initial plans
to achieve a reduction in rights focused on payments to farmers
who agreed to retire their rights, based on acreage and economic
value calculations. No consistent or agreed value for the water
was available, because no market existed. The estimated total cost
of this program was USD$45 million over 50 years, dependent on
assumed linear reductions over that period and farmers’ willing-
ness to participate (Hansford, 2014).Fig. 2. Diamond Valley groundwater area.In terms of Step 1’s Existing institutional, planning and property
right arrangements, water entitlements (rights) in the Valley are
issued under the prior appropriation system where the oldest
licences are assigned full allocations ahead of more recently issued
(junior) rights. Also, under a current beneficiary-use requirement
there is no incentive to innovate and ensure efficient water-use.
If all the water assigned to a user is not used, then they risk the cur-
tailment of that right, which incentivises over-consumption. Given
the demand for extraction change and reductions in over-use, in
2015 the State Engineer decreed that all claimants to water rights
(surface and groundwater) would need to provide proof to
substantiate existing rights and that the community would have
10 years to prepare an approved groundwater management plan.
If they failed to do so, the State Engineer would curtail water-use
on the basis of seniority.
The threat of water regulation has helped in identifying that
there are net benefits from trade and moving towards different
reallocation systems. In terms of assessing Step 2 of the framework
(Net benefits of Trade), commissioned studies in the Valley show
evidence of significant gains from trade versus curtailment (e.g.
Zeff et al., 2016). This reality, has provided the impetus to under-
take the legal and institutional reforms necessary to make sure
all existing property rights and arrangements are now conducive
to trade. Consequently, the Diamond Valley plan is now well
advanced, and in 2017 proposed a five-year process to convert all
existing rights into tradeable shares; make annual allocations in
proportion to the number of shares held; meter and enforce (with
penalties) water-use; gradually curtail extraction to a sustainable
level cap over a 30-year period; create a State Guarantee of share
register and water account integrity; and implement efficient
short-term trade; and management via a local governance board
(Zeff et al., 2016).
The political and community acceptance of such a radical
change in water governance was able to be achieved by allowing
reversibility in the plan. For example, if at the end of five years if
the community believed the new sharing regime to be inferior to
the original priority regime, then all new shares would be can-
celled and the old regime resumed (which is not expected). Sum-
marising all this information in Table 3, and applying the WMRA
framework, suggests that the Diamond Valley has progressed mar-
ginally beyond Step 1 toward the early stages of Step 2, with a
range of market initiating changes still required to achieve market
development.
5.2. Applied Example Two: Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain
Spain has often been identified in the literature as the blueprint
for future water markets in the European Union (Hernández-Mora
and del Moral, 2015). In particular, the Guadalquivir River Basin
(GRB) in Spain is an interesting applied example as it is expected
to play an important role in the country’s water market develop-
ment and expansion. The GRB has the country’s longest river (Gua-
dalquivir River – 666 km in length); spanning 12 independent
provinces and four autonomous irrigation communities/regional
governments (Fig. 3).
Demand is dominated by irrigated agriculture (89% used for
both annual and perennial crops). Surface-water resources provide
the bulk of supply (74%), supplemented by groundwater. Total con-
sumptive water demand in the Basin is 3,845,100 ML per annum,
while estimated average water resources are around 3,607,600
ML/year. Hence, water scarcity is a defining feature of the GRB
which has historically been addressed through the construction
of 65 interconnected dams and storages. There is no cap or closed
basin arrangement, and thus new water concessions (rights) can
still be granted and new irrigated zones planned. Consumptive
water demand is dependent upon seasonal water availability and
Table 3
WMRA application summary.
Key Fundamental Market Assessors Diamond Valley Guadalquivir Tasmania
Property Rights/Institutions
1. Water Legislation
2. Unbundled rights X X
3. Rights transferable X
4. Rights enforceable X
5. Constraints between connected systems X
Hydrology
1. Documented hydrology system
2. Understanding of connected systems
3. Future impacts modelled
4. Trade Impacts understood
5. Resource constraints understood X
6. Resource constraints enforced (e.g. existence of a cap/closed basin) X X
Externalities/Governance
1. Strong governance impartiality X
2. Existence of externalities understood
3. Water-use monitored X
4. Water-use enforced X
System Type
1. Suitability of water sources for trade
2. Transfer infrastructure availability/suitability
3. Regulation requirements for trade X
Adjustment
1. Gains from trade (no. users/transaction costs/diversity of use)
2. Political acceptability of trade X
Entitlement registers and accounting
1. Trustworthy systems X X
2. Trade and market information availability X X
TRADE STEP REACHED Steps One to Two Step Two Step Three
Note: In the table above a X indicates further reform required for that issue in the particular regional example; indicates that there is good evidence supporting that
particular part of the assessment; while a smaller indicates that there is positive but still limited evidence, and thus room for improvement.
Fig. 3. Guadalquivir River Basin area.
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some of the requirements in Hydrology Considerations and System
Type in Step 1).
In terms of addressing key fundamentals of existing property
rights/institutions in Step 1, irrigation water rights date back to
the 1879 Water Act, updated in 1985 to provide renewable legal
rights for up to 75 years (which are still attached to land and man-
aged by a Community of Irrigators under an ‘administrative con-
cession’). The need to address water scarcity and the benefits of
potential water trade motivated Law 46 in 1999, resulting in theintroduction of temporary trade markets between Irrigation Com-
munity members on a limited scale (under requisite regulatory
limits around use-type, location, extraction conditions and/or
return flow requirements). Permanent sales of water without land
are either not legally possible, and/or difficult to ratify through the
collective-management arrangements. However, a significant
impediment to trade has arisen from some historical decisions
taken by the River Basin Authority, which have undermined the
trust of some irrigation communities with regard to the security
of their property rights. Uncertain right arrangements have thus
S.A. Wheeler et al. / Journal of Hydrology 552 (2017) 807–820 815curtailed involvement in larger-scale GRB trade, and reduced the
benefits associated with transfers between hydrologically-
interconnected irrigation communities.
In terms of assessing the Net Benefits from Trade in Step 2, while
water charges and scarcity within communities have driven tem-
porary trade and water bank trades since 1999, the scale of market
trade remains low. Other trade-reducing influences include: i) agri-
cultural user scepticism toward trading and socio-economic con-
cerns about trade consequences; ii) irrigator substitution of
surface-water for other sources such as groundwater, (although
laws have been implemented to limit such substitutions, approxi-
mately 80% of groundwater users have not registered for a permit);
iii) high transaction costs (lengthy times to assess and approve
lease transfers, coupled with many conditional restriction require-
ments); and iv) lack of information and specialised trade platforms
and/or third-party providers (Hernández-Mora and del Moral,
2015). However, the GRB’s second water management Basin Plan
(2015–2021) aims to review such water right issues, and may
implement a range of further property right and institutional
reforms. From the WMRA framework (Guadalquivir in Table 3) it
is clear that despite water market objectives this applied example
remains situated in a Step 2 loop, sitting between Market initiatingFig. 4. Tasmanian Ichange I/II and Maintaining the Status Quo. Although considerable
effort has been put into trade-enabling mechanisms and
arrangements, these are still not supported by separation of land
and water property rights (Institutional change) and broader per-
ceptions of property right security. In sum, the GRB is an example
of a jurisdiction that is somewhat advanced in its water market
development/implementation, but which has fundamental issues
with governance impartiality and trustworthy systems. Before
movement can be made towards permanent trade, the following
issues need addressing: capping all GRB extraction (including
groundwater) to be consistent with the EU’s Water Framework
Directive; separating land and water rights; and investments in
property right security and institutional reforms.
5.3. Applied Example Three – Tasmanian Irrigation, Australia
The third example is in Australia, but outside the MDB. Tasma-
nia is an island state to the south of the mainland with catchments
that are hydrologically disconnected, creating independent alloca-
tion planning areas, diverse management arrangements and differ-
ing potential for water market development (Fig. 4). The state has a
cool temperate climate that can vary widely regionally betweenrrigation areas.
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located on the eastern side of the island in regions where water
capture, storage and delivery is possible.
In recent years, many new irrigation schemes have been pro-
posed with the backing of state and federal grants to further eco-
nomic development (as outlined by the Tasmanian Water
Development Plan). This development objective is being achieved
through public-private partnership arrangements (similar to past
irrigation subsidy proposals experienced on mainland Australia)
with a budget of AUD$220 million (Tasmanian Irrigation, 2012).
Many catchments are not fully allocated, in the sense that water
available for extraction/consumption exceeds current water enti-
tlements. The exception is where hydro-electricity generation is
present (NWC, 2013a).
In terms of assessing Step 1’s key fundamentals of Existing insti-
tutional, planning and property right arrangements and Hydrology
Considerations and System Type, Tasmania’s state agencies are well
advanced. They have developed surface-water and groundwater
hydrological models, coupled with a freshwater ecosystem value
database. This information provides sustainable yield and extrac-
tion catchment data, stress rankings and a management interface
capacity (Tas DPIPWE, 2017). In addition, Tasmanian Irrigation
(TI) used historical hydrology data tested against climate change
runoff models developed by the CSIRO sustainable yields project
(CSIRO, 2009) to help set scientifically-defined sustainable con-
sumptive limits for each irrigation scheme (NWC, 2013b). Manda-
tory farm water access plans are used to ensure land is managed in
accordance with the water development plan. Irrigation schemes
have a projected 100-year life, and are planned to supply water
at an average annual reliability of 95%.
Tasmanian planners are currently focussed on developing and
supporting the institutions needed for water trade among affected
stakeholders, particularly those in the agricultural sector. Water
entitlement and allocation arrangements are being designed to
facilitate water trading, as it was assessed that there were consid-
erable Net Benefits to be derived from Trade (Step 2) because of the
number of irrigators, the heterogeneity of agricultural production
in the region, and future demand for Tasmanian agricultural pro-
duction (especially given the likely pattern of climate change
across Australia). For example, many viticultural producers are
relocating to Tasmania as they are unable to keep growing key
varieties in traditional production areas on the Australian main-
land given warming temperatures, changing seasons and increased
pest burdens.
State planners have also made significant progress towards leg-
islative changes, i.e.,Market initiating changes – Stage I and II in Step
2. For example, as each irrigation region is developed, unbundled
water entitlements will be sold via an open tender using a reserve
price. Moreover, ongoing operational costs, including asset refur-
bishment or renewal provisions will not be subsidised, and must
be met by annual water charges on licence holders (making them
consistent with the Australian National Water Initiative). Other
market reforms include a water register that defines licence own-
ership, protects registered financial interests and facilitates both
temporary and permanent transfers. An online trading platform
has also been established to reduce trade transaction costs;
although an identified institutional weakness is that the TI register
does not have the capacity or the legal obligation to record price
data (NWC, 2013a).
The application of the WMRA framework (Table 3) to Tasmania
indicates that many prerequisites for effective and efficient trade
are present. For example, there is a cap on resources; a water plan
and rigorous planning process; robust entitlement registers and
water accounting arrangements with all barriers to trade (other
than those hydrologically justified) removed. In addition, there
are no restrictions on ownership and no requirements to use allallocated water, and any unintended trade-related environmental
externalities are adequately managed by regulation.
TI has therefore reached Step 3 of the framework: Trade enabling
mechanisms, where change and adaption is needed as a result of
future monitoring and assessment. Further development of trade
between users and monitoring of progress will help determine
future changes or reforms. As a consequence, there may be a need
for further adjustments to the steps of Existing institutional,
planning and property right arrangements and Market initiating
changes – Stage II, such as improved data collection and other
water planning arrangements needed to sustain market
development.
5.4. Summary and discussion of key insights from the regional
examples
Table 3 provides the overall summary, and the application of
the framework to our specific regional examples. Apart from the
key fundamental need for strong, trusted institutions and gover-
nance to allow the development of water markets in any jurisdic-
tion, which limits the regions where water trade can be
successfully applied, there are three important lessons that emerge
from the application of the WMRA framework to the examples: i)
unbundling; ii) sequencing; and iii) ‘never waste a good crisis’.
In many jurisdictions unique bundling arrangements are used
to protect the resource by keeping use within sustainable limits.
A water licence may, for example, require that the water be used
only for a specific purpose and applied in a specific manner. Such
arrangements discourage conservation and make it difficult for
administrators to reduce total use. In Spain, the continued exis-
tence of uncertain property right enforcement limits for trading
outside a communal area, is an important barrier to efficient
water-use and discourages investment—which is avoided in the
MDB given the fact that entitlements are issued to users rather
than the community and local controls on the trade of shares
and/or annual allocations confined to the setting of reasonable exit
fees. The costs of trading shares and allocations are low and can be
finalised quickly. This avoids any obligation to use all annually
allocated water and incentivises investment in water conservation;
especially when it is possible to save water for subsequent use as
will soon be the case in the Diamond Valley. The Tasmanian exam-
ple highlights the value (and necessity) of unbundling water rights
ahead of introducing trade arrangements. These arrangements
encourage the management of long-term supply risk with water
via water entitlement trade, while water allocation trades encour-
age efficient water-use on a day-by-day basis.
As identified by Young (2014b), correct sequencing of water
reforms is critical. A recognition of the limits to water-use, associ-
ated restrictions on further extraction and genuine incentives to
change behaviour are all essential factors in successful water mar-
ket adoption. In particular, rights and water accounting rules need
to be consistent with hydrological realities. Return flows, for exam-
ple, should be included in the water markets accounting frame-
work. In the Spanish example, although return flows are often
accounted for within an irrigation community, conflicting alloca-
tion requirements and hydrological information about environ-
mental flows place the GRB at high risk of desertification due to
water over-extraction. Thus, Hernández-Mora and del Moral
(2015) argued that a great deal of further institutional develop-
ment was required before water trade can be increased. This high-
lights that implementing water trading without fully
implementing the required laws, institutional capacity and admin-
istrative systems in a basin will only increase transaction costs;
and fuel scepticism about market benefits.
Each of the applied examples provide key lessons about the
opportunities that can be garnered from crises and using trade as
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from the fact that trading encourages the development of adminis-
trative systems that are self-enforcing. In Tasmania, the conse-
quences of costly climate change on traditional agricultural
production (especially viticulture), the success of MDB water mar-
kets (and the ability to consider the lessons from earlier mainland
water market establishment) enabled planners to select the most
suitable institutional reforms and systems needed. By contrast, in
the Diamond Valley the water crisis has resulted in the willingness
to implement considerable institutional and property right change
and funding to rectify key hydrological information gaps.
Our application of the WMRA framework to the examples in
this study indicates that it provides a useful tool for helping water
planners/managers to evaluate the relevant information/condi-
tions needed for water markets and, as a consequence, potentially
respond to the fundamental problems of water scarcity. The appli-
cation of the framework suggested it may serve as a practical, rel-
atively quick and non-prescriptive means for water managers/
policy makers in different jurisdictions to assess the appropriate-
ness of emergent or developing water market arrangements.
We stress that the development of successful market reforms
depends critically on the existence, impartiality (and security) of
local water institutions. Our applied examples provide evidence
of how jurisdictions undertake their planning process and how,
during the development of water allocation plans, those with exist-
ing rights to water are required to engage as part of extensive
stakeholder consultation. Where stakeholder consultation occurs,
this may ensure that knowledge held by these groups is not over-
looked, reduce community and political opposition, and potentially
lower the cost of (further) modifying extraction or consumption
limits. Further, where a resource is shown to be over-extracted/
consumed and new information arises about the unsustainable
nature of extractions, reductions in use can then be managed in a
manner that does not necessarily negatively impact market confi-
dence. This is encapsulated in our WMRA framework. Neverthe-
less, we acknowledge that this framework is only a first step
forward; further testing, application and refinement will obviously
be required. Further research would help operationalise WMRA as
would consideration of comparable measures within and across
examples/scales and over time, particularly in regards to trading
activity.6. Conclusion
Water demand-management strategies will need to be imple-
mented across the world as regions increasingly grapple with
water scarcity. One possible strategy includes the establishment
of water entitlement and allocation systems that make rapid,
low-cost water trading possible. The applicability of such systems
to various regions is often unknown, and there is a dearth of infor-
mation, guides or manuals that showwater managers and planners
how to proceed. To assist this process, a WMRA framework (and
associated set of questions) was developed to offer practitioners
a non-prescriptive three-step framework: 1) assess hydrological
and institutional needs; 2) evaluate market, development and
implementation factors; and then 3) monitor and continuously
assess effectiveness.
The framework was applied to three examples from different
countries to help evaluate the potential for water markets to
address water scarcity issues, by an assessment of market
enabling/constraining conditions. Our preliminary findings suggest
that WMRA may help practitioners identify the reforms needed to
help improve existing arrangements, or correspondingly identify
that market arrangements are not possible for their region. As with
any proposed framework, further testing and application is
required to assess its applicability and value.Acknowledgements
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water market literature.Appendix A: Water market assessment questionsIssues Questions to guide discussion/thinking PriorityProperty Rights/Institutions
Legislation Does legislation exist which gives a clear understanding of rights to water
for individuals/corporations and other legal entities? If so, is the degree of
attenuation clear, and which legislation (or pieces of legislation) are
pertinent?⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Are the rights separable – or attached to other rights such as land? ⁄⁄⁄⁄
Individuals/groups Do the rights vary for classes of right holders and or with respect to time
(for example, rights that may have been established under different law in
time)?*Environment If so, what are the differences in the classes of rights? *
Change/adaptation mechanisms Are rights transferrable, and is there a legislative mechanism for enabling
transfer?
⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Road to other property rights Can permanent and temporary trades take place – what is the impact of
permanent trades on viability of infrastructure services along parts of the
system network?***Unbundled rights Is trade only provided for in relation to entitlements, or can trade in
derivatives take place?**Risk assignment Can a trade be readily enforced and/or reversed if counterparty defaults? **
How are property rights enforced, and is the enforcement regime effective
and efficient?⁄⁄⁄⁄(continued on next page)
818 S.A. Wheeler et al. / Journal of Hydrology 552 (2017) 807–820Appendix A: Water market assessment questions (continued)Issues Questions to guide discussion/thinking PriorityWhat are the rules, if any, relating to carryover and other future period
transfer of unused portion of allocations in any year?*What rules/constraints attach to trading rights between connected
systems?⁄⁄⁄⁄What rules attach to the technology underpinning the delivery of water to
users – such as season delivery rules, channel delivery rules, etc.?⁄⁄⁄⁄Are the rights able to be qualified in any other way – and if so, on what
basis?**What is the risk attached to the characteristics of rights – and when does
the risk materialize and can the risk be transferred with the right?**How are rights presently allocated/weighed between uses – such as urban
water corporations and the environment, and what interplay is there with
the rights that are privately held?*How do others (e.g. financial institutions/property valuers) view the value
and risk profile of rights?**Hydrology
Connected systems Is the hydrology of the system well understood, well documented, and
monitored and reported on in a way that is supportive of trade?
⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Regulated/Unregulated Is there groundwater interaction with surface-water and are the
interactions understood, documented, monitored and reported on?⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Limit & consequences of breach
? environment? end of systemAre the systems modelled and is the impact of a range of future resource
scenarios understood by potential market participants and regulators in
relation to the system performance (both in terms of economic and
environmental use)?⁄⁄⁄⁄Use, including interception Is interception of run-off included in the measurement and management
of the system – or is there risk to catchments from growth in ‘off stream’
interception?***Do we know what we don’t know Have water quality and or environmental considerations the potential to
cause the system to fail?***Salinity/water quality considerations Is the interoperability that results from trade tested or modelled? ⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄
Big picture assessment to bring these two areas together – are the rights
articulated in a way that is sympathetic to:*** The resource constraint; and
 The extent to which resource knowledge is complete.⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Externalities & Governance Considerations
Institutional Governance Is the administrative culture and behaviour of those involved in making
decisions respected and trusted? In other words, is the governance of an
area strongly impartial?⁄⁄⁄⁄Sleeper/dozers Are there rights in existence that have been inactive, that if traded into a
market, may over commit the resource?***Input on average vs 70% rule How does change of use impact on external environment – energy and
road infrastructure, supply chains, demand for labour, etc.? And is this a
pecuniary externality or a real externality (noting only the latter should be
a policy concern)**Known change of use and hydrology inputs Does the supplier have the systems, resources and technology to monitor
use, and to ensure use is within licences/entitlements?⁄⁄⁄⁄Unregulated ‘‘use” Can unregulated use be detected? ***
Metering/Compliance Can water use be metered, enforced, with penalties imposed? ⁄⁄⁄⁄
Adjustment
Heterogeneity? Gains from trade Is there a sufficiently diverse (potential) market for water use in the
system to facilitate trade (willing buyers/sellers with different use profiles
in terms of value add per $ of water) and what is the likely magnitude of
these gains (ex-transaction costs)?⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Societal pressures Is the political context mature enough to deal with trade – and accepting
of the gains from trade as well as the adjustment costs in terms of activity
changes that will be involved with trade?⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄New knowledge Is there access to the skills, knowledge and finance needed to take
advantage of the production possibilities afforded by access to water from
trade?*Early-mover advantage
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Legislation Has the State made plans for trade in the system, and how far advanced is
the planning?
⁄⁄⁄⁄Plans Are enabling resources (e.g. registers) available/reliable/ trustworthy? ⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄
Registers Is information made available on likely market conditions for trade, and is
it reliable and trustworthy?
⁄⁄⁄⁄Early-mover legislation How mature, effective and efficient are the regulatory settings, the
institutions and the services that support trades (e.g. Online trading
platforms).⁄⁄⁄⁄Information availability Have intermediaries indicated a willingness to support the function of the
market?***Allocation announcements
Compliance
Monitoring, Evaluation and Review
IntermediariesSystem Type
Regulated/unregulated Which water sources in the system are capable of being made available for
trade?
⁄⁄⁄⁄Surface-water/Groundwater What is the status of infrastructure and what are the costs of accessing
water in the system, and at various parts of the system?⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄Connectivity Does trade need to be regulated for system performance and/or economic
and social interests in different parts of the system and at whose cost
(benefit)?***If so – have the rules for trade been identified based on reliable data and
articulated to the market and regulators?***References
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